Research and policy on property rights, collective action and watershed management requires good understanding of ecological and socio-political processes at different social-spatial scales. On-farm soil erosion is a plot or farm-level problem that can be mitigated through more secure property rights for individual farmers, while the sedimentation of streams and deterioration of water quality are larger-scale problems that may require more effective collective action and / or more secure property rights at the village or catchment scale. Differences in social-political contexts across nations and regions also shape property rights and collective action institutions. For example, circumstances in the Lake Victoria basin in East Africa require particular attention to collective action and property rights problems in specific "hot spot" areas where insecure tenure leads to overuse or under-investment. Circumstances in the uplands of Southeast Asia require analysis of the opportunities for negotiating more secure rights for farmers in exchange for stronger collective action by farmer groups for maintaining essential watershed functions.
INTRODUCTION
Many analysts see two obvious property rights problems inherent in watershed management. First, farmers in upland areas will fail to invest in soil conservation measures when they have insecure property rights. An obvious answer: governments should strengthen individual rights to those lands and support land markets. Second, farmers in upland areas do not take account of the off-farm impacts of their investments and land use patterns. Another obvious answer: governments should create private property rights and markets for environmental goods and services.
Most analysts would admit that these are likely to be only partial solutions to the watershed management problems in developing countries. The high transaction costs involved in establishing property rights or arranging efficient exchanges implies possible roles for collective action among groups within a particular catchment. And there may be a public interest in the way that the watershed is managed that is not served by either the private market or collective action solutions. The public sector may thus play important roles, often in concert with local community groups.
The issues of property rights, collective action and public sector interventions are made more complex when one considers that the common wisdom on catchment 1 International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, Nairobi, Kenya. 2 International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, Bogor, Indonesia. 3 International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, Bogor, Indonesia. hydrology, erosion, and soil movement is based on several fallacies. The cause of many of these fallacies is a lack of understanding of key ecological processes affecting the movement of water, soil and pollution loads.
In this paper we identify and discuss a number of key issues for property rights and collective action in watershed management that are particularly related to the issues of scale, flows and filters. Our approach is to integrate insights from ecological and socio-economic theory, evidence from the international literature, and our own first-hand experiences from work in Southeast Asia and East Africa. Section 2 focuses on the ecological underpinnings of watershed management, developing the concepts of scales, lateral flows and externalities. Section 3 presents some information on the problems of watershed management and research on watershed management in Southeast Asia and East Africa conducted by the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF).
In Sections 4 and 5 we use that base of practical and theoretical information in discussions of property rights and collective action in watershed management. Section 6 then discusses the roles of government, non-governmental and research organizations in watershed management.
INSIGHTS FROM THE LANDSCAPE ECOLOGY OF WATERSHED MANAGEMENT

WATERSHED AND CATCHMENT MANAGEMENT
In this paper, we follow Tiffen and Gichuki (2000) in distinguishing between the terms 'catchment' and 'watershed'. A catchment is "the area of land from which rainwater can drain, as surface runoff, via a specific stream or river system to a common outlet point which may be a dam, irrigation system or municipal / urban water supply off take point, or where the stream / river discharges into a larger river, lake or the sea" (DENR, 1998, p.29) . On the other hand, a watershed is a "whaleback land unit" that forms the upper area of one or more catchments, with hydrologic linkages to lower parts of the catchments (Tiffen and Gichuki, 2000) .
The term 'watershed management' is usually used to refer to both the management of both watersheds and catchments. In practice, it is clear that some policies and programs are focused on the protection of the upland watershed areas that form the headwaters of streams and rivers, while other policies and programs are focused on the management of the land and water throughout catchment areas. The term 'watershed management' has often been the basis for top-down management approaches by outside agencies, particularly in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Policies and programs in northern Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are primarily concerned with the maintenance of tree and forest cover on upper watershed areas in order to maintain the quality and quantity of water in rivers emanating from the uplands. The presumption is that trees reduce sediment runoff and increase water infiltration, leading to higher dry season base flow and less sediment in lakes and rivers. High dry season base flow and infiltration are given particularly high value in rice-based societies with large concentrations of people living in flood plains.
On the other hand, catchment management is concerned with the use, allocation and ownership of units of landscape that are comprised of complex formations of soils, landforms, vegetation and land uses and the flows of water that link them together (Lal, 2000, p.4) . In recent years there has been a marked increase in the focus on catchments as units of land management in both developed and developing countries (Rhoades, 2000) . The main issues motivating catchment management usually include: (1) on-site land productivity and the welfare of the people who rely on that land; (2) annual water yield flowing into reservoirs used for electricity generation, irrigation, and municipal uses; (3) peak (storm) flow of water and the implications for floods in lowland areas; (4) dry-season base flow, especially for people, animals or industries that draw water directly from streams; (5) appearance and safety of water in lowland areas; and (6) sedimentation of lowlands, reservoirs and lakes (Van Noordwijk et al., 1998, p. 224) . On the basis of an extensive review of the literature, Aylward (2000) concludes that soil erosion caused by agricultural production causes substantial off-site damages in the United States and similar areas around the world, but that the evidence is less conclusive on the importance of off-site damages of soil erosion in the tropical regions.
FALLACIES OF WATERSHED AND CATCHMENT MANAGEMENT
Over the years, a number of presumptions have become entrenched in the policy making process. Many of those presumptions are fallacies. One common fallacy is the magnitude of soil loss due to erosion. Plot or farm-level studies of erosion are often 'scaled up' to the landscape level through simple multiplication of per plot measures by the area in such plots. Viewed from the landscape scale, however, it becomes clear that soil that moves from one place in the landscape is often deposited at another place in the landscape. The key issues therefore are not related to the total amount of soil that moves, but the quantity that moves across boundaries, and the value of that soil in source and sink areas (Nagle, 2001; Van Noordwijk et al., 1998) . Soil that moves from a hillside to an eutrophic lake would change from an asset to a liability. On the other hand, soil that moves from a hillside to a rice paddy may increase in value.
A second common fallacy is that agriculture is the dominant source of soil erosion in agricultural landscapes. In fact, minority land uses like footpaths and roads are often the main sources of erosion and sediment. For example, in some parts of Kenya it has been estimated that the level of erosion was 16 tonnes per hectare per year for grazed land, 13 tonnes per hectare per year from terraced land, and 250 tonnes per hectare per year from roads (Reid, 1982, in Tiffin and Gichuki, 2000, p. 314 A third common fallacy is that there is a short time lag between the detachment of soil in one location and its movement through the catchment or water system. There now is ample evidence that there often are very long lags -decades in many cases --between soil erosion and the deposition of that soil in major rivers or lakes. Agricultural landscapes are comprised of sediment sources, sediment and nutrient filters, and stores of past sediment. Lateral flows between these different parts of the landscape often occur very slowly. Nagle (2001) A fifth common fallacy is that catchments are appropriate units for natural resource management (Forest Management Bureau, 1998, p.4) . From a hydrologic perspective, it is obvious that most important interactions between people and their environment occur within catchments. On the other hand, rivers and streams often form the boundaries, rather than the center lines, of social and administrative units. Rivers and streams have several advantages as boundaries -they are easily observable, relatively fixed in space and difficult to transverse. There may be tradeoffs, therefore, between the convenience of using existing social and administrative boundaries and the logic of realignment along hydrologic boundaries (Johnson et al., forthcoming) .
TWO APPROACHES TO SCALE
We may recognize two different approaches to scale: scale as hierarchy or scale as magnitude. The hierarchy approach of ecology portrays a phenomenon as a series of hierarchical relationships. The system of interest (level 0) is a component of some higher level (level +1). Level 0 itself can be reduced into a number of components (level -1).
'Scaling up' in this approach is concerned with a shift in emphasis from a lower level (0) to a higher level (+1), while 'scaling down is concerned with a shift in emphasis from a higher level (+1) to a lower level (0) (King, 1991) . Some of the principles of hierarchy theory are as follows:
(1) Different types of hierarchy are appropriate for understanding and addressing different problems of watershed management. For example, plot level studies may be appropriate for understanding how different land uses affect the erodibility of different soils, while landscape-level studies are necessary for understanding how different landscape mosaics affect the sedimentation of streams.
(2) In general, it is not possible to transpose principles developed at one hierarchical level to higher or lower levels. For example, it is not possible to use data on stream sedimentation to draw conclusions about the severity of on-farm erosion in particular parts of the catchment area. If we are concerned with watershed management problems manifest at different hierarchical scales, then we need to design research and solutions that integrate across those scales (Schreier and Brown, 2000) . (4) Higher level processes can be used to predict the outcome of lower-level processes, but it is often more difficult to predict higher-level outcomes on the basis of information about lower levels (King, 1991) . For example, it is difficult to predict stream sedimentation on the basis of plot-level erosion.
Hierarchical scales for catchment management can be defined in several different criteria. One criterion is the Strahler stream order classification (Strahler, 1957) . A third criterion is political -administrative boundaries and groupings, with the smallest unit being a plot and the largest being a group of nations. There may be some correspondence between the different hierarchical scales, but there will invariably be some important differences. Administrative boundaries may have some correspondence with socio-cultural boundaries, although socio-cultural units will tend to be less spatially defined and less homogenous in size than administrative units. This will be particularly true for ethnic groups who are relatively mobile, such as fishers, pastoralists and migrant Table 1 ). In contrast, many of the catchments in East Africa are endorheic, that is, they empty into lakes or reservoirs. For example, twelve of the larger rivers (i.e. stream networks of thousands of kilometers and catchments of thousands of square kilometers) originating in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda empty into Lake Victoria.
Only a small proportion of the sediment from those rivers ultimately finds its way down through the Nile river system to the Mediterranean Sea.
ICRAF conducts multi-disciplinary research in three catchments Southeast Asia:
the Mae Chaem catchment in northern Thailand, Sumber Jaya catchment in Sumatra, In East Africa, ICRAF's research focuses on the basin of Lake Victoria, the second largest fresh water lake in the world. Lake Victoria supports livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of fishers and traders directly, with 30 million people living in the 168,000 square kilometer lake basin. Lake Victoria is also an important global resource, with hundreds of fish species and one of the highest rates of speciation ever recorded.
Lake Victoria now experiences a triad of problems -increasing loads of nutrients and other pollutants, colonization by water hyacinth and related water weeds, and destructive and unhealthy practices of fishing that have led to a ban on exports to the European Union.
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CATCHMENTS
Property rights are contested in all three of the Southeast Asian sites. For example, 70 percent of the land area of Indonesia is now classified as State Forest, with the millions of people who live in those areas considered to be illegal squatters (Fay et al., 1998) . State forests are frequently given out as forest concessions and tree plantations, ignoring the previous uses of that land. Social conflict over the use of those lands is high. One manifestation of that conflict was the Indonesian fires of 1997 and 1998. Rural residents used fire as a weapon to damage firms with logging concessions, while plantation owners used fire to displace local people (Fay et al., 1998) .
Most of the area included in the Sumber Jaya catchment in Indonesia was (1) identify areas prone to particularly severe and rapid degradation; (2) evaluate technical interventions and institutional options for reducing sedimentation of the Lake Victoria water system while improving the welfare of people living in the Lake Basin,
and (3) 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF WATERSHED RESOURCES
PLOT AND FARM-LEVEL PROPERTY RIGHTS
As indicated in the introduction, there is a common conception that ill-defined property rights at the plot and farm levels are a major cause of erosion and sedimentation.
The logic is that if farmers do not have secure rights in their land, they will not have the incentive to care for that land or make long-term investments in its improvement. The way to solve this problem is to support the development of private property rights and land markets (Tiffen and Gichuki, 2000, p. 310) .
Public action in support of more secure collective or private property rights may indeed be appropriate in some circumstances. One such circumstance is where other important actors -government, forest plantations, and wealthy absentee landlordsmonopolize land rights in competition with smallholder farmers. For example in Southeast Asia, smallholder farmers compete with forest companies, commercial farmers, absentee landlords and the state for land rights in upland watershed areas.
In most of Africa, land is still governed by customary institutions that provide smallholder farmers with relatively secure and long-term property rights. Indeed, in many parts of Africa, farmers are able to gain more secure and permanent rights by investing in the land. This provides contradictory incentives vis-à-vis watershed management. On one hand, land clearing is an investment that can inhibit watershed protection. On the other hand, investment in soil conservation and trees can enhance watershed protection. Overall, however, the soil degradation observed across much of Africa is likely caused by many factors in addition to insecurity of land tenure (Place and Swallow, 2000) .
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF UPLAND WATERSHED AREAS
The concept that the state needs to take control of upland watershed areas is based on an assumption that farmers' individual land use practices will be in direct conflict with the social objectives of watershed protection. On that basis, governments, particularly those in Southeast Asia, have declared vast tracts of land to be state land. There are several problems with this approach for the management of upland areas. The first problem is that the approach is based on some of the fallacies discussed above. For example, it is assumed that forest is the only land use consistent with watershed protection and that tree planting is the best way to restore watershed protection to a degraded hillside. The second problem is that the state agencies made responsible for managing land are often motivated by objectives other than watershed protection. Some of these objectives may be consistent with the public interest, such the conservation of biodiversity, while other objectives are contradictory to the public interest. The allocation of state forest is often used for political patronage, extraction of rents, and retention of political power. The third problem is that the millions of farmers who live on state forest land remain on the land, but at risk of eviction. This lack of tenure security discourages land husbandry and investment. Finally, conflicts between smallholder farmers and the state may be manifest in destructive land use practices, for example, using fire as a weapon in a land-use conflict (Tomich et al., 1998) .
Property rights to upper catchment areas are also overlapping and contested, particularly in Southeast Asia. In the Manupali catchment area of the Philippines, for example, there are overlapping rights by the national Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the indigenous Talaandig people who have an ancestral claim to a large part of the public lands, and migrant settlers who are homesteading on these lands.
There are also overlapping jurisdictions among government entities. The boundaries of the municipalities surrounding the Kitangad Range Natural Park overlap entirely with the public state forests. Thus, three types of management plans must be reconciled for the land conflicts to be resolved: the Park and buffer zone management plan, the ancestral domain claim and management plan, and the natural resource management plan of each of the surrounding municipalities. Appropriate land tenure instruments will need to be agreed upon by all these parties to ultimately resolve the confusion.
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EROSION HOT SPOTS
Within a landscape, it is usually possible to identify specific areas -hot spotsthat are responsible for a disproportionate share of the erosion and sedimentation problems. In the Nyando River Basin in Kenya, for example, the main erosion hotspots appear to be forest margins, roads, footpaths, hillside areas, gullies at the base of escarpments, and river banks. There is considerable variation in property rights across these areas. Forests are contested resources in Kenya, with pressure for conversion into farmland exerted by smallholder farmers and large-scale commercial producers. Again, some type of co-management regime may be appropriate for the management of those new types of filters.
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CATCHMENTS
There are several ways in which public agencies, resource users, and those affected by lateral flows of sediment, water and pollution could work together to solve the problems of watershed and catchment management. One way, discussed in the introduction, would require the state to create property rights to watershed services and a market for the exchange of units of those services. Such approaches may have promise in a few developing countries where markets are very well developed. In most countries in the developing world, however, the transaction costs that would need to be incurred to implement such solutions are prohibitive. Collective action -people working together toward some common goal -is a potential solution. In this section we draw upon the literature and our experiences from the Philippines and Kenya to propose some principles to guide the search for effective collective action:
FARMER FIRST
Collective action for catchment management is likely to be successful when it appeals to the self-motivation of farmers to improve their fields and the welfare of their families (Shaxson, 2000) . Successes observed in both Kenya and the Philippines emanate from the benefits that individual farmers obtain from investments on their individual fields and farms. The three primary motivations for individual farmers to adopt soil and water conservation practices are reduced risk, increased possibility for cash crop production, and avoidance of punishment (Tiffen and Gichuki, 2000) . Tiffen and Gichuki (2000, p.316) explain that the success in the Machakos area of Kenya of "More People Less Erosion" occurred in part because the Machakos farmers were able to transform their investments in land conservation into cash earnings from the sale of coffee.
PEOPLE MANAGE WATERSHEDS
The conventional wisdom is that planning for watershed management should be done on the basis of hydrologic boundaries. There is good logic underlying this assumption --the flows that are of greatest concern are encompassed by catchment boundaries. But the practical challenges of mobilizing local social and political support across political boundaries are a major limitation to this approach. It is thus increasingly acknowledged that the practical approach may be to make general plans on a catchment basis, but to mobilize action within the smallest political units and only gradually work back up to the coordination of these actions across the catchment as a whole (Johnson et al., forthcoming) . The Landcare experience in Australia and the Philippines, and the experience of the Catchment Committees in Kenya, lend support to the approach of building from the village up. To date there has been much experience in stimulating collective action at the village level, but successful cases of scaling this up to the watershed level are still fairly rare.
SMALL IS STILL BEAUTIFUL
The bulk of the experience with catchment management shows that the "small is beautiful" (Schumacher, 1973) hypothesis holds true in watershed management. In the Philippines, people have been most interested in forming Landcare groups at the subvillage level, with groups of less than 40 members . In Kenya, the catchment approach has worked best where focal areas are small, where they fall within a single local government area (sub-location), and where the members know each other as neighbors (Tiffen and Gichuki, 2000, p. 306) .
Lateral flows create some of the rationale for organizations that form to internalize externalities. e.g. negotiation between upstream and downstream groups.
However, these interactions are often over-emphasized. For one thing, a focus on lateral flows may ignore the possibility that the installation or strengthening of a landscape filter or barrier may be the best way to reduce an externality. Secondly, groups may be more strongly linked through economic networks than through lateral flows. If there are not strong lateral flows, or if lateral flows can be effectively mitigated without super-village groups, then it may not be worthwhile to form organizations to facilitate interactions between small groups.
THE LARGER THE SCALE, THE GREATER THE NEED FOR EXTERNAL MEDIATION
If indeed there are significant benefits to be gained from collective action at larger social scales, then there may be an important role for some credible external agency. For example, the Philippine Strategy for Improved Watershed Management (DENR, 1998) involves building up from village Landcare groups with the facilitation provided by provincial and national government agencies.
ROLES FOR EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
This concluding section of the paper will focus on the role of external research and development agencies in light of the discussion of property rights and collective action presented above.
ROLES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WATERSHED AND CATCHMENT MANAGEMENT
The experience so far is that donor agencies want non-governmental organizations involved in watershed management projects because they are seen to be more participatory and more willing to listen to farmers' concerns than government agencies. In Kenya and the Philippines, we also have substantial evidence that the state can also be an important part of the solution. The state can play a variety of roles at different scales. At the village level the state can help to facilitate the development and effectiveness of local organizations. In the case of Landcare in the Philippines the state assists by mobilizing, training, and directing extension officers to assist group facilitation (Garrity et al., 2001) . At the municipal level the state can provide significant assistance through policy and financial support to group activities and strengthening. At the national level a favorable policy environment may be a crucial element for local organizations to be effective.
INFORMATION BROKERS
Information and knowledge are often the most limiting factors in catchment management (El-Swaify, 2000) . The Landcare concept is that information brokers (e.g. research organizations, universities) can assist in providing all stakeholders with a good base of information for making decisions that affect their lives, their farm enterprises, and the community. Better information and skills may also be important to assist negotiation to manage or solve conflicts among stakeholders with competing interests (Garrity et al., 2001; Johnson et al., forthcoming) . Research organizations can play key roles in providing both information and training.
PRIORITIZING PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN CATCHMENT MANAGEMENT
One of the possible roles of research organization is to provide governmental and non-governmental organizations with information that can be used to determine priorities for the use of public funds in catchment management. There are two overall approaches to priority setting:
• General prioritization of funds according to the objectives of human welfare and environmental conservation. In those areas, the state can provide a very low-cost method for groups to form, then direct support to those communities that are selfmotivated and already willing to invest substantial resources of time and effort of their own.
• Prioritization of areas with large land management problems that can be ameliorated by some change in land use or installation of a filter. This is the approach that ICRAF and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development are taking in Kenya.
The approaches may also be combined. For example, after selecting the localities where major land management problems are most critical, the flow of support to communities in the area may be directed on the basis of the relative quality and motivation of the local organizations in different communities.
